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Overview of Agenda/Presentation
• Motivation and problem statement
• Recap from prior work
– Conceptual model based on OSD’s SoS SE Guide
– Computer simulation: Exploratory SoS Acquisition  Model
• Snapshots from illustrative problems
– Dynamic impacts of requirement interdependency, risk, span-of-
control
– Incorporating network structure characteristics in model
– Monte Carlo simulation of example problem to observe outcome 
statistics
• Summary and ongoing research
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Motivation 
Literature on recent history indicates a variety of challenges for SoS acquisition
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SoS Sources of Complexity
• Dynamic and Uncertain Connectivity
• between levels of abstraction
• across scope dimensions
• “Porous” boundary
• Changes in constitution of SoS 
• Heterogeneity & Multiplicity
• Multiplicity of perspectives: A root cause of interoperability issues




the amount of information 
necessary to describe the 
regularities in a system 
effectively
• multiple time scales
• emergence (unforeseen interdependencies)
• Evolving nature of an ‘open system’
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Root Causes of Failure 
(within acquisition processes)
• Misalignment of objectives among the systems 
• Limited span of control of the SoS engineer on the 
component systems of the SoS 
• Evolution of the SoS
• Inflexibility of the component system designs
• Emergent behavior revealing hidden dependencies 
within systems 
• Perceived complexity of systems 
• Challenges in system representation
Used categories from Rouse, W. (2007, June). Complex Engineered, Organizational and Natural Systems. Systems 
Engineering, 10, 3., pp. 260-271
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Recap: Research Goals
• Uncover underlying functions affected by complexities due to evolution 
in SoS acquisition and span-of-control
• Capture Dynamics: Exploratory SoS Acquisition Model
– Depicts the processes (SoS SE Guide) in a hierarchical setting 
– Show the flow of control between the processes throughout the acquisition 
life-cycle
– Interactive computational model: allow users to ‘explore’ complexities
• Experiment: Generate insights and approaches to improve the 
probability of program success
• Mapping of Operational Views (OV) to Systems Views (SV)
– System capabilities and their interconnections
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Recap: Development of a Dynamic, 
Exploratory Model for SoS Acquisition
1. Pre-Acquisition Model (not included here)
– Understand the influence of external stakeholders on the 
acquisition process
2. Acquisition Strategy Model
– Based on the 16 technical management and technical systems 
engineering processes outlined in the Defense Acquisition 
Guidebook (5000 series) applied to an SoS environment (SoS-
SE Guide)
– Conceptual model depicts the processes in a hierarchical setting
to show the flow of control between the processes throughout 
the acquisition life-cycle 
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Recap: Acquisition / Development – The Paper Model
(based on SoS SE Guide)    i
System-level
• System dependency
• Initial completeness level
• Int/Imp time 
• Probability of disruption 
(comes from risk-profile)
Requirement-level
• Number of requirements
• Requirement dependency
• Probability of disruption
Project-level (SoS)












Operational (OV):  systems work 
together to provide a capability
System (SV): define nature of 
interaction between systems
Programmatic: relationship 
between systems during 
development
Operational capability (derived from SoS)
• Discrete-event simulation with probabilistic behavior of systems
• Levels have predetermined probability of disruption
• Requirement-level disruptions: affect design solutions (i.e. design solution of 
system X cannot meet requirement)
• System-level disruptions: affects completeness level of system and completion 
time (i.e. set back in implementation phase of system X results in longer time)
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Illustrative Example


































System Dep (R2) 
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Effect of Requirement Dependency
Requirement 2 waiting for 
Requirement 1 to complete 
(reach Testing)
Decision Analysis rejecting 
Design Solution as infeasible
(Requirement-level disruption)
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• Inevitable disruptions on both system-level and requirement levels will occur 
• Technology Assessment is able to immediately trace and resolve the problem
– This prevents the development from stalling or regressing over multiple time-steps
Negative disruptions correspond to 
system re-engineering and lower 
completeness level in Integration  
(and Implementation) phase
Each color represents an 
individual system (system ‘a’
is blue)
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Effect of Project Risk
(determines probability of disruption in Integration and Implementation phase)i  ili   i i  i  I i   I l i  
• Some systems have a much higher risk factor
– They are more vulnerable to negative disruptions in their development 
• Higher risk of disruptions implies more time to complete the stage
– In fact, completion may fail Æ return to Design Solution












































































Low-risk instance High-risk instance
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Effect of Span-of-Control
High Span-of-control Low Span-of-control
 









































• Span-of-control has large impact on project time
• High span-of-control Æ SoS level authority, can implement in parallel
• Low span-of-control Æ less coordination, implement in series, results in 
longer completion time
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Monte Carlo Simulation
(Outcome Statistics from 100 runs)
• Span-of-control has large impact on completion time
• Distribution of results nearly normal
• How do the mean values compare for different control parameters?
Independent Requirements & 
high span-of-control
Independent Requirements & 
low span-of-control














































































Decision Analysis  disruptions: 
Independent of risk




Low-risk: with 0.01 probability
Mid-risk: with 0.10 probability
High-risk: with 0.15 probability
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Result Analysis

























































• Span-of-control overshadows risk-level and requirement interdependency 
• Impact of dependency and risk-level multiplied when coupled with span-of-control
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SoS Configuration Scenarios Considered
• Consider 19 randomly generated SoS configurations 
– Uniformly random selection of number of systems (up to10 systems)
– Random selection of links between systems with correlation of 0.25
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Impact of System Interdependency
(high span-of-Control)
• Average risk variation is the average 
different between low, mid, and high risk
• On SoS with more nodes /systems (‘+’
symbols) but same number of links, the 
impact of risk on completion time is larger












































number of links in SoS/network
• Higher number of links means higher 
completion time
• Impact of risk appears relatively small when 
compared to impact of network size
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Impact of System Interdependency
(low span-of-control)
• Span-of-control (low) overshadows impact of SoS complexity
• Average completion time not affected by increased system 
interdependency (complexity)
• Different risk-levels give nearly same average completion time
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Reflections
• Exploratory model is intended to enable acquisition professionals and 
program engineers to learn about complexities, dynamics, and 
disruptions, identifying markers of failure and success
– Evolution of interdependencies
– Network structure and span-of-control of SoS
• What role should the SoS engineer play in relation to the program 
managers?
– Understand the system dynamics so that a motivator for PMs is 
identified 
• Understand cascading effects of budget (risk) and requirement 
changes
– Ability to react quickly (agility) with-in requirement cycle
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Ongoing/Future Work
• Use real acquisition data in model
– Collaborating with Interdependence Risk Study project of Rob Flowe at 
ODUSD(AT&L) SSE/SSA
– Presently are incorporating data from DAES charts in model
• More detailed description of risk and its impact at the SoS level
– Risk due to: technology, advocacy, schedule, funding
– Investigate structure and dynamic of program data as a dynamic 
network model
– Second and third degree impacts of risk that depend on network 
structure
• Dynamic time-scales: Investigate partial/gradual implementation or 
development of requirements
– Stable intermediate forms
– Risk may be reduced because it is also a function of time
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Thank You
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Extra Slides I
Operational vs. Acquisition Risk




















Option 1 Option 2 Option 3
Option 4 Option 5
• Each network represents a potential SoS that can meet a given requirement
– These are five options available to the SoS engineer
• Which SoS should be chosen?
– What is the tradeoff between  operational and  acquisition risk among the five options?
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Operational vs. Acquisition
• Each point is the absolute risk (1st, 2nd, … order of risk based 
on network structure) of the five SoS presented earlier
• Robustness is assumed to be the inverse of risk
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